There can be no doubt that Congress has divested the Indians of any inherent power to regulate in this area. In the area of liquor regulation, we find no 'congressional enactments demonstrating a firm federal policy of promoting tribal self-sufficiency and economic development.'

The Government does not dispute, and we have no reason to doubt, that the logging and road-building projects at issue in this case could have devastating effects on traditional Indian religious practices. ... However much we might wish that it were otherwise, government simply could not operate if it were required to satisfy every citizen's religious needs and desires.

An Indian tribe's power to exclude nonmembers from a defined geographical area obviously includes the lesser power to define the character of that area. ... It is difficult to imagine a power that follows more forcefully from the power to exclude than the power to require that nonmembers, as a condition of entry, not disturb the traditional character of the reserved area.

There is no dispute that Oregon's criminal prohibition of peyote places a severe burden on the ability of respondents to freely exercise their religion. Peyote is a sacrament of the Native American Church and is regarded as vital to respondents' ability to practice their religion. .. [But] I believe that granting a selective exemption in this case would seriously impair Oregon's compelling interest in prohibiting possession of peyote by its citizens.

Absent explicit congressional direction to the contrary, we presume against a State's having the jurisdiction to tax within Indian country, whether the particular territory consists of a formal or informal reservation, allotted lands, or dependent Indian communities

In light of our precedents, we hold that the restoration of unallotted reservation lands to the public domain evidences a congressional intent with respect to those lands inconsistent with the continuation of reservation status.

The 1894 Act contains the most certain statutory language, evincing Congress' intent to diminish the Yankton Sioux Reservation by providing for total cession and fixed compensation. Contemporaneous historical evidence supports that conclusion, and nothing in the ambiguous subsequent treatment of the region substantially controverts our reasoning.

The 1855 Treaty was designed primarily to transfer Chippewa land to the United States, not to terminate Chippewa usufructuary rights.

Faced with the unhappy choice of determining which part of a flawed statutory section is in error, I would thus rely upon the long-established Indian canon of construction and adopt the reading most favorable to the Nations.

The Court issues a broad holding that significantly alters the principles that govern determinations of tribal adjudicatory and regulatory jurisdiction. ... I would not adopt a per se rule of tribal jurisdiction that fails to consider adequately the Tribes’ inherent sovereign interests in activities on their land, nor would I give nonmembers freedom to act with impunity on tribal land based solely on their status as state law enforcement officials.